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Twice in the 2020 term, in Bostock and Comcast, the Supreme Court 
doubled down on the reasoning of “but-for causation” to interpret 
antidiscrimination statutes. According to this reasoning, an outcome is 
discriminatory because of some status—say, sex or race—just in case the 
outcome would not have occurred “but-for” the plaintiff’s status. We think 
this reasoning embeds profound conceptual errors that render the decisions 
deeply confused. Furthermore, those conceptual errors tend to limit the 
reach of antidiscrimination law. In this essay, we first unpack the ambiguity 
of this but-for causal reasoning. We then show that this reasoning arises 
from a misapplication of tort law principles within antidiscrimination law, 





In two 2020 cases, the United States Supreme Court interpreted two 
antidiscrimination cases to impose a particular “but-for causation” standard. The 
first case, Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media,1 concerned 
what a plaintiff must plead under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which provides in 
relevant part that, “persons . . . shall have the same right in every State and 
Territory . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”2 
The second case, Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, (consolidated with Zarda and 
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes), concerned whether Title VII’s prohibition 
of discrimination “because of sex” makes it unlawful to fire someone for being 
transgender or gay. In both cases, the Court held that plaintiffs pursuing a claim 
under these statutes must plead and eventually show that the complained-of 
 
1 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1013, 206 L. Ed. 2d 356 (2020). 
2 Pub. Law. . . . (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). 
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outcome would not have occurred “but-for” the plaintiff’s sex or race—that is, if 
the plaintiffs’ sex or race were different than it in fact is.3 
The Comcast and Bostock decisions suggest that this causal test—which 
we’ll call the ‘but-for causal test’—defines discrimination. More specifically, they 
suggest that if an outcome would not have occurred but-for a plaintiff’s protected 
status (e.g., as a woman, as Black), then the outcome is an instance of 
discrimination.  
In this paper, we hope to persuade you that this understanding of 
discrimination embeds profound conceptual errors that render the decisions 
deeply confused, and that also threaten to limit the reach of antidiscrimination 
law. What makes a given outcome discrimination, we think, is not whether it was 
caused by a plaintiff’s status. Instead, it is a question of whether it was caused by 
an action or policy acted upon or reinforced nefarious social meanings associated 
with a protected status, or hierarchical social positions that are typical of these 
statuses. However, our goal in this paper is not to provide a theory of 
discrimination; it is, rather, to show that one is needed: the but-for causal test 
cannot tell us what discrimination is. 
Part I of this essay focuses on unpacking the inherent ambiguity of the 
but-for causal test, and the problems that it causes within antidiscrimination law. 
This test, we point out, relies on counterfactual questions—that is, asking 
questions about alternative ways things might have been. But what alternative 
ways do we imagine? How we imagine these alternative possibilities determines 
the outcome of the but-for causal test, but the Court leaves these alternatives 
ambiguous, creating a deep indeterminacy in its decision-making.  
Within tort law, as we point out in Part II, the range of relevant alternative 
possibilities are constrained by the question at hand: namely, whether damages 
would have occurred if a negligent or duty-defying action or policy had not 
occurred. This, we note, is a strikingly different from the question of whether 
damages would have occurred if the action or policy per se had not occurred. This 
difference is essential to our primary criticism of the Court’s applications of the 
but-for test within antidiscrimination law. Were these applications to mirror those 
in tort law, the relevant question for the Court would be whether certain damages 
(e.g., losing a job or promotion) would have occurred if a discriminatory action or 
policy had not occurred. But this is not what we find. Amazingly, we instead find 
 
3 “To prevail, a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but-for race, it would not 
have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-
Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). “So long as the plaintiff’s sex was one but-for cause 
of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law.” Bostock v. Clayton County., Georgia, 140 S. 
Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020). 
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the Court asking whether damages would have occurred if the plaintiff had a 
different status (e.g., a different race or sex). This is then coupled with the idea 
that, if the answer is “no,” this shows that the action or policy that caused those 
damages was discriminatory. This is not only a misapplication of tort law 
doctrine, but also a misapplication that renders these decisions hopelessly 
confused, and that potentially limits the reach of antidiscrimination law.  
In Part III, we focus on an alternative way to use the but-for test within 
antidiscrimination law. On this approach, a court must first determine whether an 
action or policy is discriminatory, and only then—assuming the answer is ‘yes’—
ask whether damages would have occurred but-for that discriminatory action or 
policy. This would make applications of the but-for test within antidiscrimination 
law mirror its applications within tort law where a substantive theory of duty 
frames which causal questions are relevant to the legal inquiry. It would also 
address the counterfactual test’s inherent ambiguity. However, it would require 
that the Court makes explicit what, we think, it is currently hiding beneath the 
Court’s talk of causation: a substantive theory of what counts as wrongful or 
unequal treatment in light of/in virtue of (i.e., because of) the social categories of 
race, sex, religion, etc.. A substantive theory of what people are owed given how 
these categories are structured is needed to decide whether a plaintiff suffered 
from discrimination; the relation of causal dependence alone cannot deliver such a 
theory. While giving a full account of discrimination is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we suggest that a good way forward is for courts to consider whether 
damages were caused by an action or policy that acted upon or reinforced 
nefarious social meanings associated with a protected status (e.g., stereotypes of 
women), or hierarchical social positions that are typical of these statuses (e.g., the 
subordination of women). 
This essay will not focus on questions of statutory interpretation, such as 
how to fix the semantic content of a statute. We do not intend to settle which is 
the right interpretation of the written law, but we do think that any plausible 
candidate must offer a coherent way to identify discrimination. If some 
methodology compels an interpretation that relies on confused use of the but-for 
test, we think that counts against the methodology. In addition, and to streamline 
our analysis, we will focus on Bostock and sex discrimination, and largely limit 
our analysis of Bostock to the case of firing an employee for being gay. However, 
we believe our analysis equally applies to the case of firing an employee for being 
transgender, as well as to other cases of discrimination under Title VII, such as 
race discrimination and religious discrimination.  
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I. THE INHERENT AMBIGUITY OF THE BUT-FOR CAUSAL 
TEST  
 
The Supreme Court relies on the notion of but-for causation in its 
interpretations of antidiscrimination statutes.4 In philosophy, but-for causation is 
cashed out in terms of a counterfactual, expressed as “a conditional sentence in 
the subjunctive mood.”5 To create a counterfactual conditional of this sort, you 
must first propose an antecedent that is contrary to actual fact, and then consider 
what would have come about under these contrary-to-fact conditions.6  
We think but-for causation is best explained through example. Suppose 
you have just dropped a water glass, and the glass shattered on the kitchen floor. 
One question you might ask is:  
 
If I had not dropped the glass, would it have shattered on the kitchen 
floor? 
 
Suppose you answer “no.” This means that you think that dropping the glass was 
a but-for cause of the glass shattering: the glass wouldn’t have shattered but-for 
the fact that you dropped it.  
Sounds simple, we know. But there is an important and inherent ambiguity 
in the analysis of these counterfactual questions. To see why, it is helpful to 
follow the philosopher David Lewis in using “possible worlds” to think through 
counterfactual conditionals.7 A possible world is a complete, alternative reality, or 
what Christopher Menzel calls a “single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing 
situation.”8 There are as many possible worlds as there are ways that things might 
have been. If you think that you could have one less hair on your head, or have 
chosen not to read this article, or have never learned to read at all, then there are 
possible worlds where those things are true.9 
 
4 See, infra, Section I.C. 
5 CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS 2 (J. Collins ed., Bradford Books Illustrated edition) 
(2004).  
6 Id. 
7 David Lewis, Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility, 2 J. PHILOS. LOG. 418–446 (1973); 
CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS, (John Collins ed., Illustrated edition ed. 2004); David 
Lewis, Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow, 13 NOÛS 455 (1979). 
8 Menzel, Christopher. 2021. “Possible Worlds.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
edited by Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2021. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2021/entries/possible-worlds/ 
9 Strictly speaking, Lewis would say that the person in the possible worlds is not you, but your 
“counterparts”—i.e., people who resemble you, but are not identical to you. Lewis, David. 1971. 
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Possible worlds are helpful when we want to analyze a counterfactual 
conditional. Return to the question of whether dropping the glass caused the glass 
shattering. Using Lewis’s framework, we would start by considering all possible 
worlds in which you did not drop the glass. We would then ask, “Is it true in all, 
some, or none of these worlds that the glass shatters?” We hope you share our 
intuition that the answer is “some”. After all, there are possible worlds where you 
did not drop the glass, but instead shattered it by squeezing too tightly, or where 
you instead threw the glass against the wall. In those worlds, the glass still would 
have shattered, showing that the dropping is not a but-for cause of its shattering in 
all possible worlds.  
The counterfactual question, “If I had not dropped the glass, would it have 
shattered on the kitchen floor?,” leaves ambiguous which worlds are relevant to 
consider when answering this question. This ambiguity is typical of 
counterfactual questions. As Lewis wrote, “Counterfactuals are infected with 
vagueness, as everyone agrees.”10 There is no avoiding this vagueness: it infects 
all counterfactual causal tests. To answer these questions, we have to first delimit 
which possible worlds are relevant for our analysis by further disambiguating our 
question. Otherwise, the question is hopelessly indeterminate. In everyday 
conversations, this delimiting typically is automatic and unspoken: we often know 
simply from context what possibilities we are being asked to consider. In the 
example above, most likely we just want to know what would have happened if 
you had not dropped but held the glass, and did so in a kitchen like your actual 
kitchen, where the laws of nature are as they actually are, and so on. There is, in 
other words, often tacit agreement about which alternative possibilities are 
relevant in the context of everyday questions about causation.  
There is no such tacit agreement, however, in the context of counterfactual 
questions posed within antidiscrimination law. There, we instead find this 
ambiguity run rampant: people disagree about what is required to analyze what 
would have occurred but-for a plaintiff’s status (e.g., gender or race). More 
specifically, they disagree about what alternative possibilities are the relevant 
ones to consider. As a result, they come to different conclusions about the same 
counterfactual questions.  
To see what we mean, let’s take a closer look at Bostock. Bostock 
presented the question of whether discharging workers because they are 
 
“Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies.” The Journal of Philosophy 68 (7): 203. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2024902 
10 David Lewis, Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow, 13 NOÛS 455, 457 (1979) 
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transgender or gay counts as discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII.11 
The majority opinion, authored by Neil Gorsuch, answered “yes”.12 The logic of 
this opinion begins with an obvious point: 
 
Under Title VII, firing someone because of sex is unlawful 
discrimination.13 
 
From here, three particular assumptions are added: 
 
(1) “Because of” should be interpreted in terms of “but-for causation.”14 
 
(2) Firing someone but-for a status that is defined in part by their sex entails 
firing them but-for their sex.15 
 
(3) An individual’s status as gay or transgender is defined in part by sex.16 
 
Putting these pieces together, Gorsuch reasons that, because the employees would 
not have been fired in an alternative possibility where they are not gay or 
transgender, these employees were targets of unlawful discrimination.17   
Notice that this conclusion rests on major interpretative assumptions. One 
such assumption (listed as (1) above) is that determining whether an outcome 
occurred “because of sex” is equivalent to the question of whether it would have 
 
11 [CITATION] (I think you can pull down the portion of the introduction that discusses 
consolidation to here). 
12 “For an employer to discriminate against employees for being homosexual or transgender, the 
employer must intentionally discriminate against individual men and women in part because of 
sex.” Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1742-1743 (2020). 
13 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020). 
14 “Title VII's “because of” test incorporates the “‘simple’” and “traditional” standard of but-for 
causation.” Id., at 1739. 
15 An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part 
on sex. It doesn't matter if other factors besides the plaintiff 's sex contributed to the decision.” Id., 
at 1741. 
16 “[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without 
discriminating against that individual based on sex.” 
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020). 
17 “If the employer intentionally relies in part on an individual employee's sex when deciding to 
discharge the employee—put differently, if changing the employee's sex would have yielded a 
different choice by the employer—a statutory violation has occurred.” Id., at 1741. 
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occurred but-for the plaintiff’s sex.18 We’ll focus on this assumption in Part II. 
For now, our focus is on the second assumption (listed as (2) above), which states 
that, to know what would have occurred but-for the plaintiff’s sex, the relevant 
worlds to consider are ones where we have changed the plaintiff’s status that is 
defined in part by sex (e.g., change their status as gay or as transgender). 
One way to think about this second assumption is to first recognize that it 
conceptually separates “being gay” into [1] the employee’s sex and [2] the sex of 
the employee’s real or imagined sexual partners. With this separation, the 
Majority reasons that, to answer the counterfactual question, we should consider 
alternative possibility where we change [1] and hold [2] fixed—that is, we should 
ask whether a gay employee would have been fired in a possible world where he 
was instead a straight woman, or whether a lesbian would have been fired in a 
possible world where she was instead a straight man.19 
We can formalize this as follows, where the arrows (or absence) indicate 
but-for causal relations (or lack thereof), and “P” stands for plaintiff.  
 






18 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020) (internal 
citations omitted) “If the plaintiff had a different sex status, would the unfavorable outcome have 
occurred?” 
19 See, e.g., “The employer hosts an office holiday party and invites employees to bring their 
spouses. A model employee arrives and introduces a manager to Susan, the employee's wife. Will 
that employee be fired? If the policy works as the employer intends, the answer depends entirely 
on whether the model employee is a man or a woman.” Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. 
Ct. 1731, 1742 (2020). 
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The Majority assumes that the relevant question at hand is whether the outcome 
would have occurred but-for the plaintiff’s sex. They then further assume that, 
given the ambiguity of this question, the relevant counterfactual possibilities are 
ones where we toggle the plaintiff’s sex ([1]), but not their real or presumed 
sexual attractions and partners ([2]), thereby also toggling their status as gay to 
one as straight. In other words, the Majority holds that the relevant counterfactual 
scenario to consider, when asking if the plaintiff’s sex was a but-for cause of the 
outcome, is one where the plaintiff is a straight woman rather than a gay man.20 
And, on the plausible assumption that an employer would not have fired the gay 
plaintiff if he were a straight woman, the Majority concludes that this firing was 
discriminatory.21  
However, this logic is wide-open to the types of criticisms presented in 
Justice Alito’s dissent, showing that a mere conceptual reframing of the 
counterfactual can yield a result suggests that sex discrimination did not occur.  
Justice Alito’s dissent can be read as a disagreement with the Majority’s way of 
delimiting the counterfactual possibilities relevant to the establishing liability 
under Title VII. The Majority decision, Alito correctly observes, rests on 
conceptualizing being gay as being a man attracted to man or a woman attracted 
to woman, as opposed to being a person who is same-sex attracted.22 It is only 
because of this framing that the Majority is able to reason that “firing for being 
gay” can be captured along the lines represented in Figure 1: a representation that 
allows the Court to toggle [1] and hold [2] fixed.  
Alito thinks that, if an employee is fired because he is gay, it is a slight of 
hand to reframe this as being fired because he is a man attracted to men—a 
framing that lends itself to the showing that he was fired but-for his sex.23 Instead, 
Alito argues, the employee was fired because he is same-sex attracted, meaning 
 
20“The two individuals [attracted to men] are, to the employer's mind, materially identical in all 
respects, except that one is a man and the other a woman. If the employer fires the male employee 
for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the employer discriminates against him for 
traits or actions it tolerates in his female colleague.” Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 
1731, 1741–42, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020) 
21 Id. 
22 “The [Majority] tries to avoid this inescapable conclusion by arguing that sex is really the only 
difference between the two employees. This is so, the [Majority] maintains, because both 
employees ‘are attracted to men.’ Of course, the employer would couch its objection to the man 
differently. It would say that its objection was his sexual orientation.” Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 
Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1762 (2020) (Alito dissenting). 
23 “[T]he Court loads the dice…because in the mind of an employer who does not want to employ 
individuals who are attracted to members of the same sex, these two employees are not materially 
identical in every respect but sex. On the contrary, they differ in another way that the employer 
thinks is quite material.” 
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1762 (2020) (Alito dissenting). 
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that the relevant counterfactual is not whether he would have been if he were a 
straight woman, but instead whether he would have been fired if he were a gay 
woman.24 (He assumes the answer is “yes”.) In other words, rather than hold the 
plaintiff’s sexual attraction fixed while toggling their sex, Alito argues that we 
should hold their same-sex attraction fixed and then toggle their sex.25 This, he 
claims, shows that the plaintiffs’ unprotected status as gay, and not their protected 
status as men or women, caused them to be fired.26  
Let’s again formalize this logic: 
 





The stalemate between Figure 1’s conceptual framing and Figure 2’s 
conceptual framing—what Alito calls a “battle of labels”—indicates an important 
 
24 “It can easily be shown that the employer's real objection is not ‘attract[ion] to men’ but 
homosexual orientation.” Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1763, 207 L. Ed. 2d 
218 (2020) (J. Alito dissenting). 
25 “It can easily be shown that the employer's real objection is not ‘attract[ion] to men’ but 
homosexual orientation.” Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1763, 207 L. Ed. 2d 
218 (2020) (J. Alito dissenting). 
26 Title VII allows employers to decide whether two employees are ‘materially identical.’ Even 
idiosyncratic criteria are permitted; if an employer thinks that Scorpios make bad employees, the 
employer can refuse to hire Scorpios. Such a policy would be unfair and foolish, but under Title 
VII, it is permitted. And until Title VII is amended, so is a policy against employing gays, 
lesbians, or transgender individuals.” Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1762 




sex attracted  
[1] Being a 
man 
Outcome 
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shortcoming of using but-for causation as a litmus test for discrimination.27 Using 
the Court’s but-for test, we must answer whether or not sex “caused” the 
outcome. But to do so, you have to delimit the relevant possible worlds for the 
counterfactual, meaning you must designate what to change and what to hold 
fixed. And which counterfactual worlds we entertain determine whether or not we 
find that the relevant outcome (e.g., the firing) would have obtained. The Majority 
holds that the employee’s sex was a but-for cause of being fired because they only 
entertain worlds where the biological sex and sexual orientation of the plaintiff 
have been changed; Alito holds that it is not a but-for cause because he only 
entertains worlds where the biological sex but not the sexual orientation of the 
plaintiff have been changed.  
The takeaway, which we discuss at length elsewhere, is that “but-for 
causal inquiry is not an independent test of discrimination; it is an expression of 
one’s normative priors about what is discriminatory/wrongful vis-a-vis sex 
categories.”28 Once we take “because of sex” to mean “sex as a but-for cause”, 
there is nothing in either the text of Title VII or the nature of causation that 
requires any particular view as to which counterfactual possibilities are the 
relevant ones to consider. Even embracing Lewis’s possible worlds approach to 
analyzing counterfactuals does not settle the issue of which possible worlds are 
relevant to our inquiry: only by answering the normative question first do we 
settle this issue.  
The possible worlds approach directs analysis to what would have 
happened in worlds that are relevant to the question being asked.29 But the 
relevant question just is the question of what counts as discrimination because of 
sex, the precise question to which—the Court imagines—the counterfactual test 
will deliver an answer. Said yet another way, to assert that this or that possible 
 
27 Alito characterizes this as a “battle of labels,” meaning “[i]f the employer's objection to the male 
employee is characterized as attraction to men, it seems that he is just like the woman in all 
respects except sex… On the other hand, if the employer's objection is sexual orientation or 
homosexuality, the two employees differ in two respects.” Bostock, 140 S.Ct. at 1762 (Alito 
dissenting). ). In an astounding act of circular hypocrisy, Alito at once acknowledges the inherent 
indeterminacy of the counterfactual test, but nonetheless asserts that he produces the right answer 
using the counterfactual test because his contrast is the right one: “[H]owever, there is no standoff. 
It can easily be shown that the employer's real objection is not ‘attract[ion] to men’ but 
homosexual orientation.” Id., at 1763. 
28 Robin Dembroff, Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Elise Sugarman, What Taylor Swift and Beyoncé 
Teach Us About Sex and Causes, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 7 (2020). 
29 “In considering the supposition '‘if I had just let go of my pen... . . .’' I will go wrong if I 
consider bizarre worlds where the law of gravity is otherwise than it actually is; whereas in 
considering the supposition '‘if the planets traveled in spirals…’ I will go just as wrong if I ignore 
such worlds.” David Lewis, Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility, 2 J. PHILOS. LOG. 418–
446 (1973) at 419–420. 
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world is relevant to consider is just another way of stating what one takes the 
guiding question to be. In the previous example of the dropped glass 
counterfactual question, ordinary speakers typically agree about which possible 
worlds are relevant to answering the question, because they agree on what precise 
question is being asked (i.e., what would happen if you held instead of dropping 
the glass). In the context of antidiscrimination law, however, people disagree 
about the normative and legal definition of unlawful discrimination because of 
sex (that is, of course, the premise of this entire inquiry), and so, they disagree 
about the precise counterfactual question being asked. As a result, they disagree 
about what should be held fixed in the background of the analysis—i.e., which 
possible worlds are relevant for addressing this question. Like the Court, we can 
take “discrimination” to mean “treated worse than others similarly situated in all 
relevant respects,” but there is nothing in Title VII that tells us what are these 
“relevant respects,” or at what level of abstraction to describe them. Even if we 
adopt the Court’s but-for reading of Title VII, then, we left at an impasse 
regarding whether a plaintiff’s sex was the “but-for” cause of a particular 
outcome. 
 
II. CASUAL CONFUSION: TAKING FROM TORTS,  
MISUSING FOR DISCRIMINATION  
 
So far, we have focused on the inherent ambiguity that attends the question of 
whether a given outcome would have occurred but-for a plaintiff’s protected 
status, such as sex or race. In this second, we want to pose an even deeper 
problem for the use of the but-for causal test within antidiscrimination law. This is 
a problem with the more basic assumption that the question, “Did discrimination 
occur because of sex?” can and should be translated into the question, “Did the 
outcome occur but-for the plaintiff’s sex?” This translation, we show, is a 
distortion of the but-for causal doctrine found in tort law, and sets up the absurd 
idea that we can determine what is discrimination—a deeply normative notion—
simply by looking at causal relations. 
 
A. The But-For Test in Tort Law  
 
But-for causal tests are central to tort law.30 Within tort law, though, the 
ambiguity inherent to these tests is ameliorated by the structure of the legal 
 
30 Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014, 206 L. Ed. 2d 
356 (2020). 
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question at hand.31 The question, in cases of tort law, is not simply whether 
certain damages would have occurred but-for the defendant’s actions; it is instead 
whether those damages would have occurred but-for the defendant’s wrongful, 
duty-defying, or negligent actions. In other words, the use of the but-for causal test 
within tort law is set up, not to tell us whether the defendant’s behavior is the 
cause of the plaintiff’s loss, but instead to tell us whether their duty-defying 
behavior is the cause of the plaintiff’s loss.  
By setting the question up in the way, courts are given a structure that 
helps them delimit which counterfactual scenarios are the relevant ones for 
determining the defendant’s liability. To see what we mean, consider the classic 
tort case where the defendant [“D”] drives 65 mph in a 25-mph zone, does not 
break in time for a child [“V”] crossing the street in the crosswalk, and 
subsequently hits and injures V. From here, we might ask: 
 
Would V have suffered this injury if it weren’t the case that D drove 65 
mph on the road? 
 
Our answer, of course, depends on what D would have been doing if not driving 
65 mph. If we simply asked the above question, we would not know what we are 
supposed to imagine D doing instead of driving at 65 mph. Is D driving at 70 
mph, not driving at all, driving at 25 mph, or igniting his car with a torch? These 
details matter. If we imagine that D was instead driving 70 mph, we might 
conclude that yes, V would have still suffered the injuries, suggesting that D’s 
driving was not a but-for cause of V’s injuries.32 But if we imagine that D was 
instead driving 25 mph, we would likely conclude that no, V would not have 
suffered the injuries, suggesting that D’s driving was a but-for cause of V’s 
injuries.  
As with the earlier shattered glass example, we again see that how we 
answer a counterfactual question depends a lot on which possible worlds we 
 
31 See, e.g., Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean by Causation in the Law Symposium: A 
Tribute to Professor David Fischer, 73 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW 433–480, 440 (2008); see also 
H.L.A. HART & TONY HONOR´E, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985)  at 133-136. 
32 Even the distance from V at which we imagine changing D’s speed is determined by these 
normative intuitions. For example, assume that at 25 mph one can safely break within the distance 
of 30 feet; at the rate of 65 mph one needs 200 feet. And assume that, in the actual event, V ran in 
front of D’s car at the distance of 40 feet. The relevant counterfactual asks us to imagine that at the 
exact moment D was 40 feet from V, D was going 25 mph, and then ask if D would have been 
able to successfully break. Similarly, a counterfactual where D was going 70 mph for 10 minutes 
prior to the accident, and so drove past V by the time V ran into the street, would not be the 
relevant counterfactual to entertain. Both the imagined speed and distance are constrained by our 
concept of what D ought to have been doing.  
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consider relevant to our question. Within tort law, though, the relevant 
counterfactual would be widely understood as:  
 
If D had not been driving negligently, would V have suffered these 
injuries? 
 
In other words, we are asked to imagine that the defendant acted in a particular 
lawful or duty-conforming manner, and then—if the answer is ‘no’—ask if the 
plaintiff’s loss would still have occurred if D had acted as duty demanded.  
Here, we hope it is clear that the relevant but-for test requires a prior and 
separate specification of duty or some other functionally similar legal-normative 
concept to get off the ground. Without that specification, it is entirely unclear 
what D is imagined to be doing in our counterfactual thought experiment, or why 
the proposed causal dependence grounds D’s liability for P’s loss. These 
normative concepts circumscribe the class of relevant counterfactual contrasts 
(things D would be doing, if not driving 65 mph) that we can consider in 
establishing that D’s action was a “but-for” cause of the outcome, and that D is 
thereby liable for V’s loss. 
In short, the counterfactual question alone does not tell us which (if either) 
of the above counterfactual scenarios to consider, the one in which D is driving 70 
mph or the one in which D is driving 25 mph. And yet, we would almost certainly 
choose the latter set-up, because we think that the relevant question is whether the 
defendant’s breach of their legal duty to adhere to the speed limit is a but-for 
cause. Jonathan Schaffer explains these intuitions about the relevant 
counterfactual contrast as intuitions that are driven by our knowledge of what is 
lawful, duty-conforming conduct.33 We agree. But this means that causal 
determinations within tort law necessarily depend on prior concepts such as duty 
and lawfulness, or some other legal-normative concepts that help us delimit the 
relevant possible worlds for us to consider. 
None of what we have said suggests that the “but-for” causal test is 
useless, or reduces to a normative judgement. For one thing, this test reveals 
instances where, even if the defendant had conformed to their duty, the plaintiff 
 
33 Jonathan Schaffer, CONTRASTIVE CAUSATION IN THE LAW, 16 LEGAL THEORY 259–297 
(2010). As Shaffer explains, “The appeal to lawful conduct is hardly new. … Stapleton, supra note 
5, at 448, speaks of the law as providing ‘filtering devices’ that ‘specify relevant hypothetical 
comparator worlds’ where ‘the specified factor in turn determines the hypothetical worlds 
(because these are no-breach worlds).’ I am arguing that a contrastive approach is the best way to 
implement this insight.” 
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still would have suffered the relevant loss.34 But still, the test cannot do this work 
without some prior, independent account of the content of D’s duty to delimit 
which counterfactual contrasts are relevant to the legal question at hand. 
Imagine that a drug company has a duty to manufacture its bottles in a 
“childproof” fashion, but has failed to do so.35 Now let us assume that a child 
throws one of the company’s non-childproof bottles at another child’s face, 
causing injuries. We want to know whether the company is liable for these 
injuries. Here, we might be tempted to ask: 
 
If the drug company had not manufactured bottles, would the child have 
suffered these injuries? 
 
The answer, someone might argue is “no”—if the bottle had not existed, the child 
would not have suffered their injuries. But, even if this is right, this doesn’t tell us 
that the company is liable for those injuries. Without any normative framing, the 
but-for test only can tell us whether the company’s actions are a but-for cause of 
the child’s injuries, and not anything about legal liability. After all, the company 
is not under a duty to refrain from manufacturing bottles altogether. What we 
really want to know is this: 
 
If the drug manufacturer had made its bottles in conformity with its duty 
(i.e., as “childproof”) would its bottle have caused the child’s injuries? 
 
Here, it seems, the answer is “yes”. The child’s injuries would still have occurred 
if the bottle had “childproof” safeguards, and so the drug company is not liable to 
the plaintiff: the drug manufacturer’s breach of duty was not a but-for cause of the 
child’s injuries. This example shows that the relevant application of the but-for 
 
34 Our example is a spin on the one provided by Mark Brodin in which, “Plaintiff brought an 
action for the wrongful death of his eighteen-month-old child. The complaint alleged that the 
infant was poisoned by ingesting pills distributed by the defendant drug company in a container 
that was not labeled ‘poison’ or marked with a skull and crossbones, as required by law,” and the 
unmarked pills were ingested by a baby who “was too young to have understood any warning on 
the bottle even if it had been there.” Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-
Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 292, 314 (1982) 
35 We are not taking the “extreme realist” position that legal causal determinations are nothing 
more than normative determinations. Joshua Knobe & Scott Shapiro, Proximate Cause Explained: 
An Essay in Experimental Jurisprudence, 88 UNIV. CHIC. LAW REV. 165–236 (2021). Rather, we 
are simply saying that which causal dependencies we ask about is a function of normative 
positions about what we owe each other. The relation of counterfactual factual dependence is still 
a matter of metaphysics, not ethics.  
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test in tort law requires a prior normative-legal concept in order to answer the 
relevant counterfactual question that determines liability. 
In tort law, but-for causation authorizes the plaintiff to haul this particular 
defendant into court for these particular losses.36 If you allege in a tort claim that 
Bill Gates breached a duty of care while rolling around in his Bentley at 90 mph 
in California because you were harmed by a passing car in New York, then you 
haven’t stated a valid claim against Bill Gates. Even under a broad delimiting of 
which possible worlds are relevant, it is not true that your injuries would not have 
occurred but-for Gates’s behavior. But, supposing Gates had hit you, our point is 
that this alone does not supply the normative grounds for assigning legal liability: 
doctrines of duty or other legal-normative assumptions about entitlements or 
lawful conduct do that.37 In order for Gates to be liable for damages, you would 
need to show that Gates’s unlawful or negligent behavior, and not simply his 
behavior per se, was the but-for cause of your damages. The “but-for” causal test 
is not a test for what counts as duty or negligence. When determining liability, the 
question of what duties or entitlements we have to each other must be answered 
independently of and prior to running this causal test.38  
 
36 See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 UNIV. TOR. LAW J. 349–356 
(2002).; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment Liab. § 4 (2000). But even if a plaintiff 
alleges a causal connection between the plaintiff’s loss and defendant’s breach of duty, there often 
are difficult issues of proof, and there are also doctrines and cases that stretch or even eliminate 
the causal requirement. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab'ys, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 615, 607 P.2d 924 
(1980) (in which the dissent characterizes the doctrine of market share liability as eliminating the 
causation connection between the plaintiff and defendants: “abandon[ing] the [] traditional 
requirement of some causal connection between defendants' act and plaintiffs' injury in the 
creation of its new modified industry-wide tort. Conceptually, the doctrine of absolute liability 
which heretofore in negligence law has substituted only for the requirement of a breach of 
defendant's duty of care, under the majority's hand now subsumes the additional necessity of a 
causal relationship.”) 
37 A substantial literature on corrective justice is dedicated to debating these issues. See, e.g., Jules 
Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice. 77 Iowa L. Rev. 427, 439-440 (1992); 
Ernest J. Weinrib, “Corrective Justice in a Nutshell,” 54 U. Toronto L. J. 349, pincite? TK (2002).  
38 Arguably, even the causal showing required for strict liability entails normative judgments to 
identify which counterfactual worlds are relevant to the causal question. See generally, 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phys. & Emot. Harm § 20 (2010) (acknowledging that “a common 
response to the recommendation of strict liability for the causation of harm is that most accidents 
happen at the literal or figurative intersection of two or more activities. This is a reality that often 
makes factual causation indeterminate and insufficient as a strict-liability criterion.”). For 
example, the assertion that, “[w]hen the defendant, by blasting, projects debris that damages the 
plaintiff's property, common parlance might lead one to observe that that damage has been almost 
exclusively caused by the defendant's activity,” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. 
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20 cmts. e–f, only makes sense if we assume (i) the relevant question 
is what would happen if defendant, as opposed to the plaintiff, had done something differently; (ii) 
the other things we imagine the defendant doing, if not blasting, exclude other abnormally 
dangerous activities. See also, Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts and 
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 A tort plaintiff must show that the defendant’s breach of duty or unlawful 
action was a but-for cause of their damages, not the defendant’s action per se.  
Framing the counterfactual contrast in these normative-legal terms gets at the 
heart of what is at issue in these cases, and helps courts treat the inherent 
vagueness in counterfactual questions by narrowing which possible worlds are 
relevant for answering the question.39 
 
B. The But-For Test in Antidiscrimination Law  
 
We turn now to the use of “but-for” causal test in the context of 
antidiscrimination law. Here, we see that the Supreme Court has long interpreted 
antidiscrimination statutes through the lens of “but-for” causation, borrowed from 
tort law.40 In Comcast, for example, the Court cites a tort law treatise and reasons 
that, “[T]he ancient and simple ‘but for’ common law causation test . . . supplies 
the ‘default’ or ‘background’ rule against which Congress is normally presumed 
to have legislated . . . include[ing] when it comes to federal antidiscrimination 
laws like § 1981.”41 However, the Court has been somewhere between vague and 
sloppy as to what the common law causation test is a test of in the context of 
antidiscrimination claims. The Court equivocates or conflates two different 
versions of this supposedly “ancient and simple” test: one that mirrors tort law by 
using a prior normative-legal concept (namely, discrimination) to narrow the 
relevant possible worlds to the counterfactual question, and another that bizarrely 
 
Traditional Strict Liability: Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOR. LAW REV. 1355, 
1380-1371 (2009). “[A]ny notion that actor or activity Y has ‘exclusively caused’ harm to actor Z 
is unintelligible ….[without] assumptions about…the legally relevant background entitlements.”).   
39 “[T]he conceptual framework and methodology of the Law provide filtering devices: that… 
specify relevant hypothetical comparator worlds.” Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean by 
"Causation" in the Law, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 433, 448 (2008). 
40 See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1431, 
1436 (2012); Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. 
Fbl Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 Buff. 
L. Rev. 69, 83 (2010); Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII 
Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 292, 312 (1982). The Court is explicit 
about drawing on tort doctrines. See, e.g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) 
(“[W]e start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of 
general tort law”). But, as we argue, this alone does not determine which of the many possible 
formulations of the causal showing one endorses. 
41 Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014, 206 L. Ed. 
2d 356 (2020). 
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frames the counterfactual contrast in terms of the plaintiff’s social status (e.g., as a 
man, as Black).42  
 The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII and other antidiscrimination 
statutes to include the “standard requirement of any tort claim,” of causation in 
fact.43 But which cause must be shown to be the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s 
alleged loss? Following the example of tort law, we think that the relevant causal 
test would ask the following counterfactual question using what we call the 
Normative Showing: 
 
Normative Showing: If not for the defendant’s discriminatory conduct, 
policy, motive, or intent, would the plaintiff have experienced this 
employment practice or loss?  
 
Instead, what we find is that the Court states the counterfactual question using 
what we call the Status Showing: 
 
Status Showing: If the plaintiff had a different sex (or race, etc.), would 
they have suffered this employment practice or loss? 
  
The slip between these two framings of the counterfactual question have render 
antidiscrimination causation doctrine deeply confused and backwards. A true 
 
42 In the context of interpreting anti-discrimination statutes, The Court switches between these 
formulations in its interpretation of . Sometimes the Court talks as if the cause that must be shown 
to satisfy the but-for causal showing is that the defendant’s “illegitimate” or “discriminatory” 
motive or act was the cause of the complained-of outcome. E.g., Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of 
African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (“Under this standard, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that, but for the defendant's unlawful conduct, its alleged injury would not have 
occurred.” (emphasis added). OThertimes the Court talks as if the cause that must be shown to 
satisfy the but-for causal showing is that the plaintiff’s status was the cause of the complained-of 
outcome. E.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1753 (2020) (“Congress's key 
drafting choices—to focus on discrimination against individuals and not merely between groups 
and to hold employers liable whenever sex is a but-for cause of the plaintiff 's injuries—virtually 
guaranteed that unexpected applications would emerge over time.”) (emphasis added); City of Los 
Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978) (“the simple test [is] 
whether the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person's sex 
would be different.’”) (emphasis added). Sometime the Court even switches between the two 
within the span of two sentences. E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 
(1989); see also id., at 237-38 (in this section the Court states that they do not believe “in the 
simple words ‘because of,’ Congress meant to obligate a plaintiff to identify the precise causal role 
played by legitimate and illegitimate motivations in the employment decision she challenges,” and 
then, “instead, that Congress meant to obligate her to prove that the employer relied upon sex-
based considerations in coming to its decision.”) (emphasis added). 
43 Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 346 (2013). 
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transfer of the but-for test from tort law to antidiscrimination law would have us 
use the Normative Showing to understand the relevant counterfactual question. 
This framing would use the normative-legal concept of discrimination to delimit 
the relevant possible worlds, playing a role equivalent to duty in tort law: it 
requires us to answer what counts as discrimination before we can run the 
counterfactual causal test. 
In contrast, the Status Showing supposes that the questions of whether 
wrongful discrimination occurred can be answered by or reduces to a question of 
causal dependence, as if the relevant but-for cause of discrimination is sex itself. 
(A particular absurdity on any mere “biological” definition of sex.44) Rather than 
apply a counterfactual question framed using the normative-legal concept of 
discrimination, the Court appears to believe that a counterfactual causal test 
framed in terms of the plaintiffs’ status will deliver a verdict as to what counts as 
discrimination. In doing so, they not only introduce further indeterminacy into the 
causal test, they also set the causal test up for an impossible task.  
We find these lessons on clear display in Comcast. There, the Court 
decided that the but-for test requires that “a plaintiff bears the burden of showing 
that race was a but-for cause of its injury.”45 In other words, the Comcast Court 
explicitly doubles down that the cause that must be shown in antidiscrimination 
cases is the cause outlined by the Status Showing. As it goes on to state: 
 
The guarantee that each person is entitled to the “same right ... as is 
enjoyed by white citizens” directs our attention to the counterfactual—
what would have happened if the plaintiff had been white? This focus fits 
naturally with the ordinary rule that a plaintiff must prove but-for 
causation. If the defendant would have responded the same way to the 
 
44 The Majority (and Dissents) assume that extension of the term “sex”—which, on their reading, 
must be the motive or cause of the plaintiff’s complained-of outcome—is merely biological sex. 
See, e.g., “[W]e proceed on the assumption that ‘sex’ signified [in Title VII] what the employers 
suggest, referring only to biological distinctions between male and female.” Bostock v. Clayton 
Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020); “If ‘sex’ in Title VII means biologically male or 
female, then discrimination because of sex means discrimination because the person in question is 
biologically male or biologically female…”; “Title VII prohibits discrimination because of sex 
itself, not everything that is related to, based on, or defined with reference to, ‘sex.’” Bostock v. 
Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1757, 1761 (2020) (Alito dissenting). Neither explain 
what they imagine it means to have merely “biological” or “sex itself” as a cause or motive (e.g., 
the person was fired merely because of their vagina or penis), as opposed to the social 
meaning/expectations/stereotypes associated with sex (i.e., the person was fired because the 
employer believed working outside the home is not appropriate for persons with vaginas). It is not 
clear what the Court would understand the corollary to be for “race itself,” or what they would 
imagine it means to have merely “biological” race as a cause of motive.   
45 Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020). 
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plaintiff even if he had been white, an ordinary speaker of English would 
say that the plaintiff received the “same” legally protected right as a white 
person. Conversely, if the defendant would have responded differently but 
for the plaintiff’s race, it follows that the plaintiff has not received the 
same right as a white person.46 
 
The difference between the Status Showing and the Normative Showing 
should be clear. The Normative Showing requires the plaintiff to show that the 
defendant’s discriminatory conduct, policy, motive, or intent was a but-for cause 
of their loss; the Status Showing requires the plaintiff to show that their protected 
status or a biological fact about their body (e.g., woman-qua-human with vagina) 
was a but-for cause of their loss. By using this Status Showing, the Court is clear 
that it is not imagining a close-as-possible world in which some discriminatory 
event is “completely and cleanly excised from history.”47 Rather, they are 
imagining a close-as-possible world in which the plaintiff has a different racial or 
sex status—that is, the counterfactual antecedent is one in which the plaintiff is 
(or is perceived to be) of a different sex or racial category than the one they in fact 
are (or are perceived to be). That, we are told, will deliver a verdict as to whether 
discrimination because of sex or race occurred. 
 
C. Problems with the Status Showing 
 
We think that there are deep problems with relying on the Status Showing 
rather than the Normative Showing in the case of antidiscrimination law. One 
problem concerns what we are talking about when we talk about statuses like sex 
or race, and so what it means to alter these statuses in a counterfactual scenario. 
Within tort law, the relevant focus in on specific events, like driving 65 mph or 
producing bottles that are not childproof.48 But this is not what we find within 
 
46 Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1015 (2020) 
(emphasis added). We disagree that the statutory language is properly, or even probably, 
interpreted as the Court suggest above. Instead of calling for a counterfactual, the terms the “same 
right ... as is enjoyed by white citizens” set a substantive standard of rights to which other citizens 
are entitled and barriers to achieving rights that non-white persons in fact face must be addressed 
under the statute.  
47 HELEN BEEBEE & A. R. J. FISHER, PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS OF DAVID K. LEWIS: VOLUME 1: 
CAUSATION, MODALITY, ONTOLOGY 235, pincite? TK (2020). 
48 See Restatement, supra note 15, at comment e ("The requirement that the actor's tortious 
conduct be necessary for the harm to occur requires a counterfactual inquiry. One must ask what 
would have occurred if the actor had not engaged in the tortious conduct.") (emphasis added). 
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antidiscrimination law. Rather than focus on events, the Court instead wants to 
alter protected statuses, like being Black or being a woman.49  
But what does it mean to change someone’s protected status? For 
example, if we are imagining a female employee as a man, are we imagining that 
the employee is exactly the same except for different genitals? If we are 
imagining that a Black employee is white, are we imagining that the employee 
grew up in the same neighborhood, and went to the same schools except has a 
different set of ancestors?50 For reasons we cannot understand, the Court seems to 
think that imagining counterfactual statuses is no more difficult than imagining 
counterfactual events. But readers familiar with causal inference in the social 
sciences, epidemiology, statistics, and computer science will know there are 
profound (to put it mildly) debates about this precise issue.51 Any time we engage 
with counterfactual questions, we have to delimit the features of relevant possible 
worlds. It is extremely and notoriously difficult to say what this means when we 
are imagining changing a person’s sex or race status. And this, of course, is 
exactly the problem that led Gorsuch and Alito to opposite conclusions about the 
same question. While Gorsuch believes that ‘changing the plaintiff’s sex’ means 
holding fixed their sexual attractions (e.g., to men), Alito holds that it means 
holding fixed their same-sex attractions. 
We can see this using other examples. Consider another prohibited ground 
for employment discrimination listed in Title VII listed—religion.52 If one thinks 
that the Status Showing can deliver an answer to the normative question of what 
 
49 See Comcast, 140 S. Ct. at 1015. 
50 The Court seems happy to define sex as a matter of biology, and cashing out sex counterfactuals 
as swapping genitals. But would they be as comfortable defining race as a matter of biology, and if 
so, what biological swaps would accomplish racial counterfactuals?  
51 Indeed, this precise question—whether social statues such as race, gender, religion, etc. can be 
conceptualized as treatments (e.g. intervention events that can be administered to units without 
fundamentally changing the unit) in the counterfactual causal framework has spawned a massive 
debate. See, e.g., Paul W. Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 JOURNAL OF THE 
AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION 945-60 (1986); Donald B. Rubin, Comment: Which Ifs 
Have Causal Answers, 81 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION 961-62 (1986); 
D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, Causal effects of Perceived Immutable Characteristics, 93 
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 775-85 (2011); Jay S. Kaufman, Epidemiologic Analysis 
of Racial/Ethnic Disparities: Some Fundamental Issues and a Cautionary Example, 66 SOCIAL 
SCIENCE & MEDICINE 1659-69 (2008); Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of 
Counterfactual Causal Thinking About Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 NORTHWESTERN 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1163-28 (2019); What’s Sex Got to Do with Machine Learning?,  in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2020 CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 
513, https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3375674 (last visited Feb 16, 2020); Tyler J. VanderWeele 
& Whitney R. Robinson, On the Causal Interpretation of Race in Regressions Adjusting for 
Confounding and Mediating Variables, 25 EPIDEMIOLOGY 473, TK (2014). 
52 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) 
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counts as discrimination on the basis of a social status by “chang[ing] one thing at 
a time and see if the outcome changes,” then it should work for all of the social 
statuses listed in Title VII.53 We hope the following example illustrates that any 
claim that the dissimilar treatment of candidates from different social statuses 
with certain stipulated similarities is discriminatory rests on a prior normative 
premise—namely, that persons similar in those stipulated respects, but different in 
social status, are entitled to similar treatment. 
Suppose an employer has a policy of prohibiting displays of religious 
observance in the workplace, meaning that religious employees cannot wear a 
symbol of significance to their particular religion. This employer then terminates 
a Christian employee for wearing a cross to work. Does this termination count as 
discrimination because of religion? Under the majority’s reasoning, the answer 
would likely be “yes.” Using that reasoning, “religious observance” would be 
conceptually separated into two parts: (1) the plaintiff’s religion [Christian] and 
(2) the relevant symbol or behavior.54 We capture this reasoning in Figure 3 (an 








53 Bostock, 140 S.Ct. at 1739. As a matter of doctrine, it seems the some members of the Supreme 
Court do not think that but-for test for disparate treatment discrimination is the same for religion 
as it is for the other statuses listed 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 773 (2015) (Justice Scalia arguing that “an 
employer who acts with the motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he 
has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would be needed,” and even if 
the employer would take the same action if an employee of a different religion or no religion at all 
asked for the same accommodation.)  
54 See Figure 1 and note 85, supra.  
 
[1] Being a 
Christian 
Outcome 
[2] P’s wearing a 
cross 
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With that separation, we could reason that an employee with a different religion—
say, Islam—but the same symbol or behavior, would not be fired (since the cross 
is not a symbol of religious observance for Muslims).55 Therefore, firing the 
Christian employee would be deemed religious discrimination—holding fixed the 
symbol or behavior (e.g., [2]), and toggling the employee’s religion (e.g., [1]). 
And this in turn suggests that their religion was a “but-for” cause of the outcome. 
In contrast, using Alito’s reasoning, the answer would likely be “no.” 
Why? Mirroring Alito’s argument and using his strikethrough text gimmick, we 
would add two additional employees to the mix: a Muslim who wears a headscarf 
to work, and a Christian who wears a headscarf to work.56 We now have four 
example employees, with the fired employees crossed out below: 
 
Christian + cross 
Muslim + cross 
Muslim + headscarf 
Christian + headscarf 
 
As Alito would have us reason, the fired employees “have one thing in 
common.”57 It is not being Christian, being Muslim, wearing a cross, or wearing a 
headscarf. It is being religiously observant. And so, we could conclude, the 
employer is not guilty of discrimination on the basis of religion, but on the basis 









55 Analogously, for a person taken to have female reproductive features assigned at birth, a skirt is 
not a symbol of gender “non-conformity,” nor is a male sexual partner a symbol of (to use Alito’s 
term) “homosexual orientation.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1763. 
56 “We now have the four exemplars listed below, with the discharged employees crossed out: 
“Man attracted to men 
Woman attracted to men 
Woman attracted to women 
Man attracted to women” 
Id., at 1763. 
57 “The discharged employees have one thing in common. It is not biological sex, attraction to 
men, or attraction to women. It is attraction to members of their own sex—in a word, sexual 
orientation. And that, we can infer, is the employer’s real motive.” Id. at 1763. 
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Our point here is not that Gorsuch’s use of the counterfactual test is better 
than Alito’s. Again, these counterfactuals are inherently indeterminate. Rather, we 
are making the point that the Status Showing does not, by itself, tell us what it 
means to change a person’s religious (or sex, race, etc.) in a counterfactual 
scenario. What’s more, how we answer this question—for example, whether we 
think that changing someone’s religion means also changes their practices of 
religious observance—will determine our answer to the counterfactual question 
that is posed by the Status Showing. 
A second problem, in addition to treating social statuses as causally 
efficacious events, is perhaps an even more important problem with the Status 
Showing. This problem is also illustrated by the hypothetical case of religious 
observation. In the above case, we cannot determine whether religious 
discrimination occurred by just looking to how the employer treats a Muslim who 
wears a cross, or a Christian who wears a headscarf, because we do not know 
which symbols are part of an individual’s religious practice. Crosses, for example, 
bear a particular significance within Christianity. The claim of freedom of 
religious expression might require, for a Christian employee, the freedom to wear 
a cross in the workplace. But we cannot know this by looking at how persons of 
other religions are treated for their own religious expressions, or lack thereof. We 
can only know this by examining the social reality of religious practice, and 
thinking about what we, as a society, want to affirm as the limits of freedom of 
religious expression.   
Return to Alito’s dissent in Bostock, and its analogy in the religious 
discrimination hypothetical. We hope you share our view that banning everyone 
 
[1] Being a Christian 
Outcome 
[3] P’s being 
religiously observant 
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from religious observance in the workplace does not answer whether banning 
workplace religious observance is discrimination on the basis of religion. The 
counterfactuals in the religion example only tell us exactly what we already knew: 
that the employer is opposed to employees wearing symbols of religious 
observance.58 Similarly, Alito’s counterfactuals regarding a gay employee only 
tell us exactly what we already knew: that the employers in Bostock and Zarda are 
opposed to employees believed to have same-sex attractions.  
Alito argues in his dissent that firing all gay employees would exempt an 
employer from the charge of sex discrimination, because it shows that the 
employer’s true target is sexual orientation, not sex per se.  But this is absurd in 
the same way that showing that an employer’s true target is religious observance, 
not religious classification per se, exempts an employer from the charge of 
religious discrimination. One can, for the sake of argument, grant that the causal 
contrasts expressed in the strikethrough text examples are true, and even that the 
employer’s intent was to pick out employees who stand in a particular relation to 
their assigned sex or religion (e.g. those that stand in a “culturally nonconforming 
way” or an “observant relation”). But we are still left with the normative question 
of whether acts or intents based on an employee’s standing in that particular 
relation to the relevant sex or religious status are thereby discriminatory.  
Rather than follow tort law, and outline its counterfactual question using 
the Normative Showing, the Court over and over again assumes that mere causal 
relations will deliver a normative result—specifically, a determination of whether 
or not discrimination occurred. Rather than take discrimination to be an event that 
may or may not have caused a bad outcome, the Court treats the plaintiff’s social 
status as an event that, if a but-for cause of some bad outcome, renders the 
defendant’s conduct discriminatory.59 In tort law, but-for causation is an 
independent element of a tort claim. It is not a way to prove that a normative 
element—breach of duty—occurred.60 But in the context of antidiscrimination 
law, the Court recasts causation as an evidentiary route to proving that the 
defendant’s conduct was discriminatory.  
 
58 They also show us that one can’t even come up with candidates for the counterfactual thought 
experiment without content-specific knowledge of the social category of religion or gender. How 
else do we know if the person is being, for example, “religiously observant” when they don the 
cross or headscarf (as opposed to a random fashion choice), or “gender conforming/non-
conforming” with respect to their sexual attractions and presentation? 
59 “To prove a violation, then, the government had to show that the defendant's challenged actions 
were taken “‘on account of’” or “‘by reason of ’” race—terms we have often held indicate a but-
for causation requirement.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of African Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. 
Ct. 1009, 1015 (2020). 
60 See Coleman supra note 25 at 439.  
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Causation describes a (metaphysical) fact about the world, that two things 
stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence. It does not evaluate whether it is 
good or bad for that dependence to hold. We need a normative theory to answer a 
normative question, and the normative question here is whether employers are 
entitled to disadvantage employees for standing in a particular relation to the 
relevant racial, sex, religious, etc. statuses. Mere causation will never give us this 
normative theory. Simply because an employer who fires gay men would also fire 
gay women does not mean that employers are not obligated to give employees 
freedom of sexual and gender expression. Even if we concede that gay men and 
gay women share the “commonality” Justice Alito proposes, nothing follows from 
it. His argument is non-sequitur, and gets us no closer to determining how men 
and women ought to be treated with respect to their sexual and gender expression. 
What we need is a prior theory of what discrimination is. Only once we have such 
a theory and have applied it, can we ask what we think is the relevant question in 
these cases: Were it not for the defendant’s discriminatory action or policy, would 
the plaintiff have suffered a loss? 
 
D. Interpretive Aside 
 
Although we promised that this essay is not about the “right” 
interpretation of the law according to some school of statutory construction, at 
this point you might object that even if the Normative Showing is better than the 
Status Showing, the text of Title VII calls for the Status Showing. Specifically, 
you might argue that the text § 2000e-2 (a)(1) does not prohibit a type of 
normative conduct undefined in text (i.e., discrimination). Rather, the statute 
prohibits a class of conduct that is defined in the text: namely, any act caused by a 
particular motive or mental state—i.e., sex, race, religion, etc..61  
 
61 A number of authors seem to interpret Title VII similar to a criminal statute, but it is not clear if 
they read the statute to forbid employment actions animated by certain motives—beliefs or 
reasons that explain why a willed act was taken—or mental states—something like purpose/intent 
or knowledge about an attendant circumstance of the act, such as whether a specific employee has 
a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin status. See, e.g., Berman, Mitchell N. and 
Krishnamurthi, Guha, Bostock was Bogus: Textualism, Pluralism, and Title VII (February 1, 
2021). Notre Dame Law Review, Forthcoming, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3777519 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3777519; Koppelman, 
Andrew M., Bostock and Textualism: A Response to Berman and Krishnamurthi (August 12, 
2021). Northwestern Public Law Research Paper No. 21-22, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3904246 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3904246 (at 10); 
Eidelson, Benjamin, Respect, Individualism, and Colorblindness (October 22, 2019). Yale Law 
Journal, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 20-05, Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3473832 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3473832. 
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You might propose that this interpretation is mandated by two provisions. 
First, it follows from reading the statutory text prohibiting “discriminat[ion] 
against any individual … because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin” to mean that the employer’s motive regarding an employee’s sex, 
race, etc. status caused the action.62 Second, you might propose it follows from 
the text of the 1991 amendment to Title VII, which says, in relevant part, that “an 
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice.”63 Specifically, you might propose to interpret 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 
(m) to define what is referenced 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (a)(1)—i.e., the normative 
concept of discrimination—as any employment practice where an individual’s 
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor.”  
What, then, counts as a sex motive or reason with respect to sex per se? 
Following both the majority and dissent in Bostock, we might define it as a 
motive or reason with respect to the employee’s status as “biologically male or 
female”.64 There are two things to note about this position. First, it defines any 
 
62 This view would seem to have radical implications for one status listed under Title VII: religion. 
Any employment practice in which persons are assigned to positions on the basis of religion, such 
as chaplains in a school or prison, or given a scheduling accommodation to observe religious 
services count as religious discrimination against that employee because that individual 
employee’s specific religion was the employer’s motive or purpose in taking the employment 
action. This would lead to a strange tension between the main prohibition of Title VII under § 
2000e-2 (a) (1), and § 2000e(j), which defines “religion” to include “all aspects of religious 
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to 
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or 
practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business,” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e 
(j) (West). On such a reading, 2000e-2 (a)(1) would define religious accommodation as 
discrimination because the individual employee’s religion is the reason for the employer’s act. 
However, the definitions section would then compel discrimination, but only for one of the statues 
(religion) listed under § 2000e-2 (a)(1). Defining failure to accommodate religious practices as 
discrimination under all circumstances just means you are not applying the same motive-based test 
for this status. In at least one case, some members of the Supreme Court proposed that failure to 
reasonably accommodate religious practices was identical to disparate treatment, while others 
argued that failing to accommodate a religious practice is not intentional discrimination unless the 
religious nature of the practices was part of the reason or motivation. E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015) (compare J. Scalia for the Majority, arguing that, “failure 
to hire ‘because of’ the plaintiff's ‘religious practice’ [here, wearing a head scarf] …is 
synonymous with refusing to accommodate the religious practice. To accuse the employer of the 
one is to accuse him of the other” (at 772) with J. Thomas dissenting in part, arguing that defining 
as intention discrimination “taking an action because of an employee’s practice [here, wearing a 
head scarf] that happens to be religious,” would “punish employers who have no discriminatory 
motive.” (at 783-84)). 
63 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (m) (West). 
64 Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1757, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020) 
CUNY Law Review, Volume 25, Issue 1, 2022 (forthcoming) 
 
   
 
27 
employment practices of sex segregation or classification—including use of 
gendered pronouns (e.g., ‘he’ and ‘she’) and the practices dissenting Justices in 
Bostock vehemently want to defend as non-discriminatory, such as sex-
specific“[b]athrooms, locker rooms, [and other things] of [that] kind,” as 
discrimination because sex is a motive or reason (read: but-for cause) for the 
employment practice.65  
 Second, interpreting the statutory text to prohibit employment practices 
caused by the motive or reason of “sex itself,”66 means a plaintiff must be under 
2000e-2(m)’s so-called mixed-motive provision anytime some other factor was 
also a reason or motive for the employment practice. If a sex per se motive is 
what qualifies an act as discriminatory, then the motives that are mixed in mixed-
motive cases are motives of sex per se and motives that are not-sex per se.67 But 
this means that in such cases, plaintiffs are not eligible for damage awards or 
reinstatement injunctive relief under the other portion of the 1991 amendment, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (g)(2)(B), which limited remedies in so-called mixed moved 
cases.68 Take an example like Price Waterhouse, where the plaintiff claimed that 
she was disfavored for (among other things) not wearing makeup and being 
aggressive at work.69 If you insist that discrimination consists solely in having sex 
qua “biologically male or female”70 as a reason or motive for the action, then this 
plaintiff presents a mixed motive case. A motive regarding wearing makeup or 
being aggressive at work is not identical to one regarding reproductive organs per 
se, and both of the former two motives were also necessary to bring about the 
employment action. Even a paragon case of “No Women Need Apply” policy 
involves mixed motives about the employee’s biological sex and about what roles 
are proper for persons with that believed sex. You would be hard pressed to come 
 
65 Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (JJ. Alito & Thomas dissenting).  
66 Id., at 1761(JJ. Alito & Thomas dissenting).  
67 On this view, the point of 2000e-2(m)’s so-called mixed motive provision is to extend liability 
(albeit, with limited remedies) in situations where the reason of sex per se was either a pre-empted 
or over-determined cause, or a necessary element of a sufficient causal set. See generally, Richard 
W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the 
Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1001, 1019 (1988) (emphasis in 
original) (adopting J, Mackie’s theory of sufficient causal sets to propose, “the Necessary Element 
of a Sufficient Set (NESS) test, [under which] a particular condition was a cause of (contributed 
to) a specific result if and only if it was a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual 
conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the result.”). 
68 “(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title 
. . . the court . . . shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, 
hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (B) 
(West). 
69 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989). 
70 Id., at 1757 (JJ. Alito & Thomas dissenting).  
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up with a single case where biological sex is the singular sufficient but-for cause 
of the employment action. So, your view that a motive of “sex itself”71 = 
discriminatory motive, would imply that most every plaintiff is properly classified 
as proceeding under 2000e-2(m)’s mixed motive provision, and thereby, limited 
to declaratory relief. 
That is not how most courts, including the Supreme Court, seem to 
understand the mixed motive provisions. The Court has not read § 2000e-2(m) to 
define what is referenced 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (a)(1)—i.e., the legal concept of 
discrimination—but to simply provide by statute that liability (albeit, with limited 
remedies) is established under Title VII where the adverse employment outcome 
had multiple but-for causes, so long as one was discrimination.72 As the Supreme 
Court recognizes, the 1991 amendments were drafted, in part, to overrule that 
portion of the Price Waterhouse decision that allowed a defendant-employer to 
escape a finding of liability altogether if it could show that it would have made 
the same employment decision in the absence of discrimination.73 Congress 
decided to provide that a plaintiff that was in fact the subject of discrimination—
but would have suffered the employment action even without it—is still entitled 
to a declaration of wrongdoing, but not to damages or injunctive relief including 
reinstatement.74 The Supreme Court seems to think a plaintiff is under the mixed 
motive provision of § 2000e-2(m)—and therefore, subject to the remedy 
restrictions of § 2000e-5(B)—only when discrimination (as opposed to sex) was 
mixed with a non-discriminatory/lawful cause.75 This interpretation, which 
understands the things that are mixed in so-called mixed motive cases as 
 
71 Id., at 1761(JJ. Alito & Thomas dissenting).  
72 “For one thing, § 2000e–2(m) is not itself a substantive bar on discrimination. Rather, it is a rule 
that establishes the causation standard for proving a violation defined elsewhere in Title VII.” 
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 355 (2013).  
73 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 90, 123 S. Ct. 2148, 2149 (2003) (noting “§ 107 of 
the 1991 Act …’respond[ed]’ to Price Waterhouse by ‘setting forth standards applicable in 
“mixed motive” cases’ in two new statutory provisions.”); William N. Eskridge Jr., Title VII's 
Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 
Yale L.J. 322, 375 (2017) (presenting evidence about the 1991 amendments that, “In 
[Congressional] committee reports, the sponsors were clear that the section aimed at Hopkins only 
‘overrules one aspect of the decision.’ One committee report emphasized that these amendments 
would in no way affect Hopkins’s holding that ‘evidence of sex stereotyping is sufficient to prove 
gender discrimination.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
74 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5 (B) (West). 
75 For example, Desert Palace concerned whether, “a plaintiff must present direct evidence of 
discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction,” Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 
U.S. 90, 98 (2003). The reason this case was even treated as a mixed-motive was because the 
defendant maintained that they had non-discriminatory reasons for the firing, namely that the 
plaintiff had a long history of volatile relations with co-workers.  
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discriminatory and non- discriminatory motives or causes (as opposed to sex and 
non-sex motives or causes) is consistent with the Normative Showing of the but-
for causation requirement. Thus, the 2000e-2 (m) provision does not define 
“discrimination” in § 2000e-2 (a)(1); we still need to know under what conditions 
having an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin as a motive for 
an act counts as a discriminatory motive. 
 
 
III. TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW  
 
The question of discrimination is an inherently normative one—one that 
asks us what is a wrongful way to treat someone on the basis of a protected status, 
be it a religious status, a sex status, or some other protected status. The religious 
observance example above shows us that answering this question requires a rich 
social understanding of these statuses, as well as a normative theory of what 
people deserve or are otherwise owed in light of what statuses mean in our 
society. Only by answering this question—i.e., applying the Normative 
Showing—will we arrive at a helpful framing for administering the but-for causal 
test, because our answer will delimit what an employer ought to have done. From 
here, we can then ask: If the employer had done as they ought to have done, 
would the plaintiff have suffered this loss?  
To answer the question of what counts as discrimination, we believe that 
the Court must rejoin this normative question of what people are owed to the 
question of what occurs “because of sex.” No act or policy regarding sexuality or 
gender expression is discriminatory in a vacuum of its relationship to what sex 
means in our society, just as a policy prohibiting crosses and headscarves is not 
discriminatory in a vacuum of its relationship to what religion means in our 
society. Only with a theory of what is wrongful in light of the social meanings and 
inequalities attending sex status will we arrive at an answer as to whether firing 
gay or transgender employees is discriminatory because of sex. Arriving at such a 
theory is no trivial matter. The categories addressed by antidiscrimination statutes 
are attended by a host of complex and contested differences. But our point is that 
the very concept of discrimination “on the basis of” these statuses cannot be 
identified by simply noting that other people with the same status would be 
treated similarly, or that people without that status would be treated differently. It 
can only be identified once we know what people are owed notwithstanding or, in 
some cases, because of, the differences that attend these social statuses. 
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To motivate this framing shift, let’s first consider the following 
hypothetical case: An employer refuses to hire someone, citing the fact that they 
dress in an androgynous fashion. When that person files a complaint, the 
employer responds, “Their sex has nothing to do with it! I would fire any 
employee, male or female, who was confusing to look at.” 
 We take it for granted that sex discrimination occurs this case.76 The 
Majority’s reasoning in the Bostock case, when applied to this case, would 
struggle to reach this conclusion because “androgyny” is not defined in terms of 
violating the norms associated with a specific sex status.77 No doubt, Alito would 
argue that “androgynous” is gender-neutral, just as he claims that being “gay” or 
“transgender” is gender-neutral, which just demonstrates his unclear use of the 
term “gender-neutral.”78 While we would not cast doubt on the Court’s ability to 
finagle their reasoning to suit this outcome, there is a simpler, logically cleaner 
way to the decision that sex discrimination occurred.  
Rather than separate “discrimination” from “because of sex,” we propose 
that the best reasoning is to consider whether the outcome is one where the 
employee was treated poorly relative to how he or she ought to be treated, given 
background facts about social inequalities, stereotypes, norms, and social 
meanings surrounding their sex status. We think that a policy that prohibits 
employees from dressing in an androgynous fashion, whether male or female, is 
wrongful in light of the social meanings of sex statuses, as any such policy 
reinforces nefarious social norms according to which there is distinct ways that 
men and women ought to dress—norms that maintain the illusion of exacerbated 
sex differences between men and women and assign material and dignitary worth 
on the grounds of conformity to those norms.79 The Majority’s mistake is to 
interpret the prohibition expressed by the phrase “discrimination because of sex” 
 
76 If you disagree, no doubt you can come up with a different, analogous case, such as where the 
employee is bisexual, not married, has no children, or anything else where the status/behavior 
described at low level of granularity is not a sex-specific stereotype (the way that “having sex with 
men” is a female-specific stereotype), but nonetheless—is a sex-related stereotype that functions 
to ground the way sex functions as a stratifying social system.  
77 That is, there is no obvious way to set up the causal diagram as in Figure One so that if you 
“hold constant” androgynous clothing (even if described at a lower-level of generality like “pants 
and plain tee shirt”) and toggle sex of the plaintiff, you will get a contrast in outcomes.  
78 A similar point could be raised about another case: Suppose an employer fires a female 
employee, citing the fact that she is too emotional in the workplace. When the employee files a 
complaint, the employer responds, “The fact that she is female has nothing to do with it! I would 
fire any employee, male or female, who was acting like a little girl at work.” 
79 Frye “This matter of our sexes must be very profound indeed if it must, on pain of shame and 
ostracism, be covered up and must, on pain of shame and ostracism, be boldly advertised by every 
means and medium one can devise.” 
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as picking out a class of things that are discriminatory because they “caused” by 
sex, instead of picking out a class of things that are discrimination because they 
reinforce or act on nefarious social meanings of sex statuses.  
By adopting the Normative Showing, we will arrive at a reasonable logic 
for antidiscrimination statutes. This much is clear from common-sense reasoning 
about action that is alleged to be wrongful because of some group-based status. 
The claim that an individual’s encounter in a particular instance is discrimination 
because of a group-based status is a statement that, “the distinctive wrongfulness 
of the action or practice is dependent upon what the category [ ] consists of.”80 An 
individual’s claim that some act counted as discrimination because of their group-
based status means that, notwithstanding the relevant norms, practices, 
assumptions, or associations that attach to that group, the person is owed some 
sort of right, access, or consideration. But we can’t answer that question unless we 
explicitly state what sorts of norms, practices, assumptions, or associations that 
attach to that group, and then explicitly stake out what we think is fair or just in 
various domains in light of those norms, practices, assumptions, or associations. 
We hope this view will also explain why the refrain “Title VII protects 
individuals not groups” has never made much sense to us.81 In so far as such 
language only means that something can be discriminatory without categorically 
harming every person ascribed membership to the group at issue, that seems 
uncontestable. Even a rule like “No women need apply” does not categorically 
exclude or harm every woman. Some women may have no interest in applying to 
that job, or even think it is immoral or wrongful for women to work outside of the 
home. For them, the rule “No women need apply” does not count as a disabling 
exclusion or even a subjective wrong because it does not conflict with what they 
believe women should be doing. But this is a paradigm instance of sex 
discrimination, because the rule is based on and reinforces nefarious ideas about 
what ought to be open to women as a class. 
The refrain “Title VII protects individuals not groups” is thus misleading 
because Title VII and related statutes require us to have some theory of what 
counts as “discrimination because of” whatever group-based statuses are named in 
the statute, e.g. sex, religion, or race, and to distinguish such discriminatory 
conduct from other kinds of conduct that is legal even if objectionable for other 
reasons. The statutory language that makes it, “unlawful [ ] for an employer to fail 
 
80 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Eddie Murphy and the Dangers of Counterfactual Causal Thinking 
About Detecting Racial Discrimination, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1163, 1179 (2019) 
81 “[T]he statute focuses on discrimination against individuals, not groups,” Bostock v. Clayton 
County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1745 (2020). 
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or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin,” means that individuals are protected in their capacities as 
members of the group, not as individual and unique snowflakes.82 The statute does 
not forbid employers from using many forms of categorizations for making 
distinctions, exclusions, or qualifications.83 Employers are even allowed to 
indulge grounds for distinctions that are expressly irrational, random, or even 
mean spirited.84 Therefore, the very terms of the statute demand that we formulate 
some way of identifying when an individual has suffered discrimination because 
of (for example) sex or race, and distinguish it from distinctions that are not on the 
basis of a protected status.  
Legal readers may, at this point in the argument, worry that our positive 
proposal applies only in cases of disparate impact claims, but not disparate 
treatment claims. Under standard doctrinal views, disparate impact claims address 
intents, act, or policies that, while they do not target a protected category per se, 
produce a pattern of outcomes for persons of a protected category that we 
(through various doctrinal tests) deem intolerable. In contrast, disparate treatment 
claims are understood to be claims that address intents, acts, or policies that target 
a protected category per se —for example, in the case of sex, a policy of refusing 
to hire women. Those who accept this distinction might be tempted to argue that 
only disparate impact claims must, logically, be defended by pointing to why the 
intent, act, or policy in question is wrongful in light of the meaning of the 
protected form of categorization, but not disparate treatment/intentional 
discrimination. The latter, on this view, counts as discrimination only on the 
grounds that the intent, act, or policy in question makes an explicit distinction on 
the basis of (for example) sex. 
 
82 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West). See also, “In passing Title VII, Congress made the simple but 
momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not relevant to the 
selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 239 (1989). 
83 “Yet, the statute does not purport to limit the other qualities and characteristics that 
employers may take into account in making employment decisions. The converse, therefore, of 
‘for cause’ legislation, Title VII eliminates certain bases for distinguishing among employees 
while otherwise preserving employers' freedom of choice.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 
U.S. 228, 239 (1989). 
84 “[O]ther than prohibiting discrimination on any of five specified grounds…Title VII allows 
employers to decide… [even] idiosyncratic criteria are permitted; if an employer thinks that 
Scorpios make bad employees, the employer can refuse to hire Scorpios. Such a policy would be 
unfair and foolish, but under Title VII, it is permitted.” Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Georgia, 140 S. 
Ct. 1731, 1762 (2020) (Alito dissenting) 
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While we cannot fully argue for this view here, this objection fails because 
every claim of discrimination must rest on normative judgments about what 
persons are owed, given social meanings attached to the relevant status (sex in our 
running example). The doctrinal division between disparate impact and disparate 
treatment relies on the notion that disparate treatment identifies a class of intents, 
acts, or policies that count as “discrimination because of sex” due to nothing more 
than the fact that they target, e.g., sex or race per se. But that is an illusion.  
Take the paradigmatic example of exclusion above: “No women need 
apply.” Let’s assume, as the majority does in Bostock, that the intent, act, or 
policy is meant to differentially treat (and specifically, to exclude) every woman. 
Even this is not sufficient to show that this policy is wrongful or discriminatory 
because of sex, as should be clear to conservatives on the Court who insist that 
differential treatment with respect to accessing bathrooms and locker rooms does 
not count as discrimination.85 We still must explain why this policy is wrongful, 
given the nefarious stereotypes, expectations, and norms of treatment that attend 
being a woman in our society.  
All of us (we hope) can come up with many reasons to justify the moral 
conclusion that excluding women from labor force opportunities is wrongful in 
light of the historical and current meanings of sex difference and stratification. 
And perhaps because that proposition is so widely accepted, the normative 
reasoning fades from view. But this is an essential part of the logic in both so-
called disparate impact and disparate treatment claims. And that is precisely our 
point: an evaluative judgment that discrimination based on a protected category 
occurred (e.g., sex) always relies on normative reasoning about what treatment is 
wrongful in light of that category. Whether an act or policy targets a protected 
category directly (e.g., “no women allowed”) or indirectly (e.g., “no people under 
5’8” allowed”) does not change this underlying reasoning. 
Now return to Bostock. To answer whether firing gay employees is 
discrimination because of sex, the Justices attempted to isolate the inquiry of 
whether the outcome (firing) was because of sex. We have shown that this inquiry 
does not answer whether the act counts as discrimination because of sex. We 
 
85 The provision of bona fide occupational qualification (“BFOQ”) for sex under Title VII — 
regardless of whether one endorses their specific exemptions—shows that the evaluative judgment 
that an act or practice is discrimination because does not logically follow from the fact that it 
consists in a distinction on the basis of sex alone, without recourse to a normative account for why 
that distinction is wrongful in light of the category of sex. It is the latter sorts of judgments that 
make many of us conclude that many of the proffered BFOQs are in fact discrimination because of 
sex, such as “being a woman dressed in a sexy uniform is a BFOQ for the job of casino cocktail 
server.” https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1115&context=djglp  
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should, instead, ask whether being fired for being gay is wrongful in light of sex-
based social norms that police the sexuality of all persons. Social norms that say 
that men ought only to have sex with women (and women with men), are 
nefarious norms that are rooted in sexism. We think people should not lose their 
jobs for deviating from these sex-based norms, and that regardless of the 
employee’s sex, firing someone for not conforming to these social expectations is 
wrongful—it is discrimination because of sex. But the question of whether 
employers ought to be permitted to police their employees according to these sex-
based norms is precisely the question that we must answer to make a 
determination of discrimination. Causation alone will not get us there. 
 
IV. A CAUTIONARY CONCLUSION  
 
The Supreme Court has a supremely confusing way of talking about 
causation in antidiscrimination law. Their approach, we’ve shown, hides 
normative judgements concerning what is discrimination “because of” a group-
based status like sex beneath a counterfactual question about what would have 
occurred but-for the plaintiff’s status. In other words, the Court smuggles in 
normative evaluation of an employer’s actions or policies under the guise of facts 
about causal inference. Our approach lays bare the normative reasoning that—as a 
conceptual matter—necessarily lies at the heart of any inquiry into what counts as 
discrimination because of a social status, such as sex or race. Moreover, it is a 
much more logical interpretation of the statutory text: something is discriminatory 
“because of sex” when what makes it wrongful—in the way that Title VII is 
concerned with wrongful conduct—is something about sex social statuses.  
Of course, our claims suggest that judges must give up the myth that hard 
cases can be decided with value-neutral methodology. But when Congress passed 
statutes with broad normative terms like “discrimination,” they explicitly 
delegated to courts the difficult task of designating acts or practices in the world 
as instances of a normative kind. We think that those with different substantive 
views about what is owed should welcome open and honest debate about what 
kinds of differential treatment is wrongful in light of the social meanings of sex 
statuses. Similarly, and in direct contrast to the machinations of the Comcast 
Court, we think that determinations of race discrimination must examine what 
kinds of differential treatment is wrongful in light of racial social meanings and 
stratification.86 
 
86 Defining discrimination in terms of but-for causation is equally concerning in the context of 
race discrimination. The Comcast Court limited itself to declaring that the “ancient and simple 
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Despite the Supreme Court’s supreme confusion about causality and 
normativity in antidiscrimination statutes, we are hopeful there is still an 
opportunity for the legal scholarly community and litigators to move the doctrine 
in a more coherent direction. We offer these reflections to start such a dialogue. 
 
“but for” common law causation test [ ] supplies the “default” or “background” rule against which 
Congress is normally presumed to have legislated when creating its own new causes of action,” 
including antidiscrimination statutes. (Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1014.) Accordingly, there is 
less to say about how the Supreme Court applied this so-called “test” to the particular facts of that 
case. Nonetheless, what the Court announced is nothing short of a nonsensical formula that gives 
license to disguise overly restrictive concepts of discrimination beneath appeals to causation. Our 
argument is not that but-for “test” for discrimination is stingy test that does not reach what we 
think it ought to reach. Rather, we argue it is an incoherent appeal to turn causal relations into 
normativity. It currently is, and will continue to be, used to obfuscate objectionable views about 
what is discriminatory in light of the meaning of race in our society. 
